Spamming was observed from Dec 23-Jan 6. Email messages were sent in groupings of 100,000, three times a day. At the same time each specific IP address did not send more than 10 messages in total, which further complicated the job of blocking the botnet.<\/p>\n
Attackers didn\u2019t have to make any special effort. In most cases, compromised appliances were badly connected to the network. Many default login and password pairs (admin\/password) were used. It was a real piece of cake.<\/p>\n
It was the first proven Internet of Things cyberattack. Experts had long warned that sooner or later, attackers would try to abuse the increasing intelligence of consumer electronics, and as you can see, they were right. Now these \u201cThingBots\u201d can send spam. Next time you may even expect them to launch a DDoS attack. I don\u2019t speak about chances here either, it is almost guaranteed. Just wait and see.<\/p>\n
There is a grimmer outlook with the growing number of so-called \u201cphysical\u201d attacks as well.<\/p>\n
Real forces<\/b><\/p>\n
By \u201cphysical\u201d attacks I am implying that they cause obvious material damage, and sometimes, colossal damage. They are still rare, but with the proliferation of the Internet of Things we have to expect the number of such attacks will grow.<\/p>\n
The most notorious example of late was the infamous Stuxnet, the cyberweapon virus designed to decommission uranium enrichment centrifuges (and it is well-known to have accomplished its mission).<\/p>\n
The Stuxnet and the concept of cyberweapon have already become a part of popular culture. For example, in the hugely popular U.S. TV series \u201cPerson of Interest\u201d, the Stuxnet is mentioned directly at least once. The subject of cyberweapons is also referred to several times.<\/p>\n
So let\u2019s assume that the Stuxnet is a phenomenon of complicated international relations. Thist still doesn\u2019t mean that commercial companies will not eventually become the targets of similar attacks. Regardless of their distance from politics, defense contracts or critical infrastructure facilities, the possibility of attacks have long and rightfully concerned professionals<\/a>.<\/p>\n It\u2019s not hard to imagine attackers remotely disabling, for instance, the climate control system at a facility with strict temperature control rules or switching off (remotely again) the alarm system in an office building before armed men in ski masks enter.<\/p>\n There may also be problems with automobile computers. Last year two experts demonstrated how to disable brakes and other systems in smart cars. And although the hack required a wired connection to the car\u2019s system, even earlier in 2010, other researchers had shown<\/a> the possibility of remote code execution in a vehicle\u2019s system via a wireless network. Thus, there is sufficient evidence that car systems can be vulnerable to external impacts and automakers are not always willing to tackle these problems.<\/p>\n There is another very recent example too: using a drone with a WiFi transmitter and the necessary software to take over similar devices and hijack them. We have recently written<\/a> on the subject. Perhaps, this is the most eloquent example of a physical attack \u2013 a phenomenon which is likely to become commonplace quite soon.<\/p>\n What we missed<\/b><\/p>\n The trend is quite clear. As the number of smart devices used by ordinary consumers and commercial companies grow, so will the number of new threats. A spamming refrigerator, a TV participating in a DDoS attack, an infected router forwarding every request to servers of cybercriminals (like DNSChanger did) \u2013 all of these examples are unpleasant, though hardly disastrous. The use of smart devices for cyber espionage is already taking place<\/a>. An electronic master key to unlock any smart locks by Onity that is used in the hotel industry is also real<\/a>.<\/p>\n The problem is that while pursuing fashionable trends, producers of smart home appliances hastily adjusted their products to include new functionalities without taking into account the fact that new opportunities will also arise for misuse.<\/p>\n By and large, history is repeating itself. More than two decades ago hardware and communication equipment manufacturers as well as software developers could hardly imagine anything like the notorious Code Red and SQL Slammer, both of which led to significant traffic slowdowns on the World Wide Web in 2001 and 2003. Accordingly, until thunder had started regular rattling, the security architecture itself was paid little attention to.<\/p>\n![\"water\"](\"https:\/\/media.kasperskydaily.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/102\/2014\/02\/06015919\/water.jpg\")
<\/a>At last year\u2019s BlackHat conference, various specialists demonstrated<\/a> their ability to remotely attack the SCADA system of an oil-well pumping station, which could have had potentially catastrophic consequences. At the same conference there was also a report about Chinese cybertroops who diligently tried to hack a water plant in the U.S., specifically looking to steal documents and change the settings of pumps. However, it turned out that the plant was actually a decoy (honeypot), and all the actions of the attackers had been carefully logged. But the present security experts verified that hackers \u201cknew what they were doing.\u201d With this regard, the question arises whether attackers have already accessed similar systems in the U.S. and other countries, and what can stop them from inflicting a major accident when they need it.<\/p>\n